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RECENT CASES
Chattel Mortgages-Liability of Purchaser at Judicial Sale of
Mortgaged Chattels Subsequently Sold to Third Person-A judgment
creditor purchased at execution sale goods subjected to a duly recorded chat-
tel mortgage and, having no actual knowledge that the goods were encum-
bered, subsequently sold them to an unknown third person. In a replevin
action 1 by the mortgagee against the execution purchaser, recovery was de-
nied because the Pennsylvania Chattel Mortgage Act of 1945,2 in providing
for a "lien" on mortgaged goods, does not specifically authorize a remedy
against an innocent purchaser who has resold. Seaboard Consumer Dis-
count Co. v. Landaus, 167 Pa. Super. 180, 74 A.2d 737 (1950).
At common law a chattel mortgage was void as to third parties
unless the goods were delivered to the mortgagee,3 because the attempted
lien was a secret one.4  Now, by statute, mortgages on chattels are gen-
erally recognized and recording of the mortgage is the statutory equivalent
to delivery to the mortgagee since it is notice to all those subsequently deal-
ing with the goods that they are encumbered. 5 The Pennsylvania Chattel
Mortgage Act 6 enunciates the generally recognized principle that a pur-
chaser from the mortgagor, or by a judicial sale, receives no greater in-
terest than that of the mortgagor.7 Although the statute is silent on the
matter, other jurisdictions have given the mortgagee recovery, usually in
an action for conversion,8 against one who, in dealing with the mortgaged
chattels puts them out of the reach of the mortgagee, 9 wrongfully appro-
1. The action was one of replevin without bond, closely analogous to assumpsit
and essentially an action in personam. PA. R. CIV. P. 1071. See Go0DRIcH-AmRAm,
STANDARD PA. PRAclcE § 1071-2.
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 940.1-940.16 (Purdon, Supp. 1950).
3. Roos v. Fairy Silk Mills, 334 Pa. 305, 4 A.2d 569 (1939); First National
Bank v. Reese, 356 Pa. 175, 51 A.2d 806 (1947) (recognizing an equitable lien be-
cause nature of goods did not warrant delivery).
4. Klaus v. Majestic Apartment House, 250 Pa. 194, 95 Atl. 451 (1915).
5. 1 JONES, CRATTEL MORTGAGES AND CONDITIONAL SALES §§ 176, 236 (6th ed.,
Bowers, 1933).
6. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 940.5 (Purdon, Supp. 1950). A chattel mortgage
"shall be a lien upon the property therein described, which shall be good and valid
against and superior to all rights of subsequent purchasers . . . and all persons
subsequently dealing with the mortgaged property or subsequently acquiring an in-
terest therein from the time of filing of the mortgage . . . and a judicial sale on
liens subsequent to the lien of a chattel mortgage shall not divest the lien of such
chattel mortgage and the title of the purchaser at such judicial sale shall be subject
to the lien of such chattel mortgage."
7. Ahearn v. Tulare Lake Co., 115 Cal. App. 93, 102, 1 P.2d 490, 493 (1931);
Covington v. Matlock, 10 La. App. 445, 121 So. 355 (1929) ; 2 JONES, op. cit. mtpra
note 4, §§ 484, 559.
S. Covington v. Matlock, mspra note 7; Kratzmer v. Detroit Lumber Co., 195
Mich. 570, 161 N.W. 817 (1917); Crawford Undertaking Co. v. Herman Siegal,
Inc., 230 S.W. 590 (Tex. 1950) ; 2 JONES, op. cit. supra note 4, §§ 490, 490a.
9. Covington v. Matlock, supra note 7.
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priates them,10 or otherwise interferes with the lien." In Personal
Finance Co. v. General Finance Co. 12 an action was brought in Pennsyl-
vania for conversion in New York of a chattel mortgage lien recorded in
that state. On appeal, the Superior Court, after recognizing the right to
recovery under the law of New York, held that there is no justification for
the conclusion that the action is contrary to the public policy of this state.'"
The decision in that case would seem to be indicative of a shift in the
court's attitude toward chattel mortgages, although not binding in the
instant case. But without reference to the Personal Finance Co. case and
without discussing the possibility of recovery in an action for conversion,' 3
the instant court construed the statute strictly, since it was contrary to
long-established public policy, and allowed no remedy here since the statute
provided for none. 14
Although the statute is contrary to the common law, it is itself an
expression of public policy 15 formulated to meet new economic demands
for expanded credit transactions, and it should, therefore, be interpreted
so as to give a remedy where a right it confers is impaired.' 6 The inter-
pretation applied by the court would require the legislature to enumerate,
and specify a remedy for, every situation in which a right granted by it
may be violated. The erection of this broad barrier to the effectuation of
the Chattel Mortgage Act indicates an antipathy based upon other social
factors. The court's reluctance to allow recovery may have been due to the
fact that it felt impelled to construe the statute strictly against the interests
which sponsored it, bankers' counsel, 17 whose expert draftsmanship gave a
great measure of protection to the money lending interests at the expense
of subsequent purchasers.' 8 In so construing the statute, the immediate
10. Crawford Undertaking Co. v. Herman Siegal, Inc., mtpra note 8.
11. Kratzmer v. Detroit Lumber Co., supra note 8; 2 JoNEs, op. cit. supra note
4, at 490.
12. 133 Pa. Super. 582, 3 A.2d 174 (1938).
13. Id. at 586, 3 A.2d at 176.
14. The attitude of the Pennsylvania courts has not been wholly antagonistic
toward mortgages of chattels for they have long recognized the principle of the
"industrial mortgage" which includes, as part of the freehold, personal property in
and about a mortgaged manufactury. Roos v. Fairy Silk Mills, 354 Pa. 305, 4
A.2d 569 (1939). In addition the legislature has permitted the mortgaging of certain
types of personal property. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 841 (Purdon, Supp.
1950) (chattels of all kinds may be mortgaged to secure loans from Federal Govern-
ment) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 861 (Purdon, 1930) (iron ore, pig iron, crude oil,
etc.); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 83 (Purdon, 1930) (coal and mining leases and
equipment appurtenant thereto).
15. See Personal Finance Co. v. General Finance Co., supra note 12.
16. "If defendant's contention [that recovery should be denied because chattel
mortgages are contrary to public policy] were accepted, it would result in withholding
a remedy from plaintiff and might very well give an undeserved benefit to the de-
fendant." Id. at 586, 3 A.2d at 176.
17. 2 PA. LEnis. J. 1291 (1945).
18. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 940.6(c) (Purdon, Supp. 1950): "Any property
covered by a chattel mortgage which may be sold by the mortgagor shall remain
subject to the lien of the mortgage, unless the mortgagee expressly consents in writing
to such sale. . . ." This section apparently was designed to make inapplicable the
rule in force in many jurisdictions to the effect that a purchaser of stock in trade is
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loss falls upon those who can better protect themselves by insuring against
such occurrences. On the other hand, it may be argued that the mortgagee,
by increasing interest rates or denying credit where the risk is at all doubt-
ful, will shift the burden to the mortgagor who is least able to bear it.
Viewed in this light, it would appear that the net effect of the decision is
to make it more difficult for those most in need of funds for emergencies
to avail themselves of this credit device.19 However, it is doubtful if good
business practice in an overcrowded and highly competitive field would
permit the lenders to increase interest rates appreciably or deny credit to
prospective borrowers. The decision, then, will protect the innocent pur-
chaser who has disposed of the goods by placing the loss upon the inter-
ests taking the calculated risk of lending money for profit. If these factors
motivated the decision, they give it a better foundation than the rationale
on which it was based.
Although the language of the decision in the instant case would seem
to be broad enough to discourage litigation over a factual situation similar
to that of the principal case, a re-examination of the decision is not un-
likely. The test may arise on the theory that the Chattel Mortgage Act
imposes a lien on mortgaged chattels superior to the interests of all sub-
sequently dealing with the goods, and that although the Act does not
expressly provide a remedy for the impairment of the lien, resort should
be made to common law principles for the protection of that lien. The
instant court denied recovery based on the value of the goods at the time
of the taking by the purchaser, being unwilling thus to make an innocent
purchaser bear all risks of loss, not to mention drops in the market value of
the goods, between the time of purchase and the bringing of suit. If, in
another suit, a mortgagee should base his claim on the value of the goods
at the time of suit or, if the purchaser has resold or otherwise put the
goods out of the mortgagee's reach, on the value of the goods at the time
of the resale, a court more sympathetic with the policy evidenced by the
Act would have a pivot on which the principal case might be distinguished.
Such a second suit could be brought upon a theory of conversion, i.e., that
the purchaser impaired the lien by reselling, or in assumpsit against the
proceeds of the sale. A retreat from the emasculation of the Act made in
the instant case might start from such a point.
a bona fide purchaser who takes good title. The rule is based on the theory that the
mortgagee who allows the mortgagor to retain the goods and place them on sale to
the public is not entitled to the benefit of his lien as against a purchaser without
actual notice. See Daas v. Contract Purchase Corp., 318 Mich. 348, 28 N.W.2d
226 (1947) ; Howell v. Board, 185 Okla. 513, 94 P.2d 830 (1939) ; Note, 46 MicH.
L. REv. 255 (1947).
The failure to protect the bona fide purchaser may have been the result of the
bankruptcy rule under the Chandler Act which provides that a security device was
not "perfected" if a bona fide purchaser's interest would be protected. 52 STAT.
869 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a) (1946). This rule has now been modified, making
the harsh treatment of a bona fide purchaser of a mortgaged chattel no longer neces-
sary. 64 STAT. 22, 11 U.S.C.A. § 96(a) (2) (Supp. July 1950).
19. Such was the purpose of the Chattel Mortgage Act, according to its sponser.
2 PA. LEGIS. J. 1291 (1945).
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Constitutional Law-Police Power-Public Interest v. Private
Interest-Statutory Prohibition of Self-Service Gasoline Stations-
In January, 1949, Irving Reingold opened the Rein Motors Service Station
in Hackensack, New Jersey. Unlike the conventional type station, this
one was operated on a modification of the customer "self-service" principle.
Effective May 28, 1949, the New Jersey legislature enacted a law pro-
hibiting the operation of gasoline stations on the self-service principle.
1
Reingold filed a complaint alleging that the statute was unconstitutional
under the due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions. The
Supreme Court, affirming the Chancery Division of the Superior Court,
held that the statute was a valid exercise of the police power. Reingold
v. Harper, 78 A.2d 54 (1951). The majority was satisfied that the
statute accomplished the professed legislative purpose of protecting the
public against an increase in fire hazard attending this form of distribution
of gasoline at the retail level.
The increased fire hazard is not as apparent as the decision might lead
one to believe. Contrasted with certain types of self-service stations which
employ no attendants, or which employ attendants who exercise no con-
trol over the handling of the gasoline, the Rein station had one employee
for every two pumps to exercise immediate control over each filling opera-
tion. Still, the proponents of the Act argued that this method of dis-
pensing gas was more dangerous than the conventional method for the
following reasons: a spark might be generated sufficient to ignite the
gas; minors would be permitted to handle a dangerous inflammable; a
lighted cigarette might start a fire; at a large station a fire might amount
to a major disaster; arsonists might be able to procure fuel; spillovers
would increase; the average motorist is not familiar with the use of fire
extinguishers; signs forbidding smoking and ordering motors to be shut
off would not be obeyed; the attendants might not be qualified. Many of
these dangers, however, exist in the same degree at conventional stations,
and there is no showing that they make a supervised self-service station
more dangerous than the conventional type.
Certain dangers are inherent in the handling of gasoline under any
method, and they may be reduced to a minimum under supervised self-
service. The local fire regulations under which the Rein station operated 
2
1. N.J. STAT. ANN. §34:3a-1 (Supp. 1950):
"It shall be unlawful for an owner, operator of any retail filling or service
station, where gasoline or other inflammable liquid is sold and dispensed to
permit any purchaser, customer or other person not connected with the owner-
ship or operation of such filling or service station to use or manipulate any
pump, hose, pipe or other device for measuring, pumping or dispensing gasoline
or other inflammable liquid for the purpose of filling the tank of a motor
vehicle, or any barrel, drum, can or other container with gasoline or other in-
flammable liquid."
2. These regulations included:
(a) The installation of "no smoking" signs;
(b) The installation of printed signs requiring the shutting off of all motors
during the filling of gas tanks and that the attendant be instructed to see that such
motors are shut off and that the no smoking requirement be complied with;
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meet every objection made by the proponents of the Act, and show that
reasonable regulation, short of prohibition, can be imposed on stations of
the Rein type. The assumption underlying the arguments in favor of
the Act is that the average motorist is far less competent to handle a gas
pump than a paid attendant. This is expressed in the Act itself, which
prohibits an attendant from dispensing gasoline unless he has had at
least one full day's training by another attendant.3 Since the Rein sta-
tion was operated by trained attendants, this requirement is partially met;
further, the period of training required is so short that it throws doubt
on the contention that a motorist does not have sufficient knowledge to
assist an attendant in filling his tank safely. Moreover, it is common
knowledge that attendants at conventional stations frequently overlook the
dictates of safety. The alleged lack of training of the average prudent
motorist could not seriously have been the primary inspiration of the Act.
The Hackensack Fire Department inspected the Rein Station and con-
cluded it was "not a hazard." 4  In California, where such stations are
widespread, there have been no serious fires or accidents to date. Both
casualty and fire insurance companies located in California maintain the
same, or even lower, rates for supervised self-service stations as they do
for conventional stations.5 Finally, both the National Fire Protection
Association, and the Committee of Flammable Liquids of that association,
have concluded that self-service stations should be permitted to operate,
provided they comply with reasonable safety regulations.0
Not only is the Act a questionable safety regulation, there is evidence
that its real purpose springs from another source. The New Jersey
Gasoline Retailers have been, and are, strongly opposed to any kind of
(c) The installation of fire extinguishers at all islands;
(d) That no gasoline be served by minors or persons who appear to be, in
the slightest, inebriated;
(e) That safety nozzles be installed (to eliminate the electrically generated
spark danger);
(f) That no coin operated or automatic gasoline vending or dispensing
machines be installed;
(g) That one attendant be assigned to duty on each island of two pumps.
[Brief for Appellants, p. 8.]
3. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:3A-2 (1939).
4. Brief for Appellants, p. 34a, incorporating a letter written by the chief of the
Fire Department on March 23, 1949.
5. In a letter to the writer from John R. Maloney, Insurance Commissioner of
the California Bureau of Rate Regulation, dated April 18, 1951, it is stated that
no study of the comparative fire hazards of self-service and conventional stations has
been made by the Bureau because no verified information has ever been found
sufficient to warrant such a study: The Commissioner adds that it is the opinion
of the Pacific Fire Rating Bureau that there is nothing unusual in regard to such
hazards that requires different rate treatment. It is noteworthy that the latter
Bureau has been solicited from time to time by various "interests" for its assistance
in attempts to prevent the establishment of self-service stations upon the premise that
these stations present a substantial increase in fire hazard, but that the Bureau has
refused, never having found any factual information sufficient to support such an
allegation.
6. See National Petroleum News, Nov. 23, 1948.
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self-service stations, and exerted pressure to have the Act passed.7 Dis-
tribution of gasoline on a self-service basis would probably generate com-
petition among retailers, eventually taking the form of lowered prices.
Many conventional stations might even be forced to convert to self-service,
and the status quo of the New Jersey gasoline situation would be threat-
ened. Stripped of its public safety purpose, the Act fulfills only one func-
tion: to maintain the price of gasoline. The New Jersey Supreme Court
itself has declared that "police power" legislation which is actually designed
to reduce competition among retail gasoline dealers will not be tolerated,8
and the United States Supreme Court has held that the states are without
power to authorize the fixing of gasoline prices.9
The circumstances surrounding the passage of the Act indicate that
it was directed at the Rein station alone.10 Coupled with the evidence that
the Act was sponsored by the gasoline interests to maintain the price of
gasoline, such unconvincing "safety" arguments should compel any court
to conclude that private, not public, interests were being served. Courts
have reiterated that, if the dominant purpose of a statute be the service
of private interests under the cloak of the public good, it must be declared
unconstitutional." The barrier to be hurdled in this regard is the extent
to which a court is willing and able to delve into the factual background
of a statute. Some courts have shouldered the burden willingly. The
Florida Supreme Court has declared that it is peculiarly a judicial question
whether a statute in fact serves a public, or private, purpose; in Liquor
Store, Inc. v. Continental Distilling Corp.'2 that court held the State Fair
Trade Act unconstitutional on the ground that it served only to fix prices
on trade-marked goods to the advantage of particular economic groups.
Moreover it went on to find that in the case of the particular plaintiff
seeking to enforce the statute, enforcement would aid in the creation of a
7. "Price control through the legislative process has long had favor among the
operators of [New Jersey] gasoline filling stations. The law before us had such
sponsorship before the Legislature, although the advocacy was professed to be
grounded in considerations of safety related to the hazards of explosion and fire."
Instant case at 59.
8. Regal Oil Co. v. State, 123 N.J.L. 456, 10 A.2d 495 (1939) (statute for-
bidding motor fuel dealers from displaying price signs of motor fuel dispensed, or
signs relating to the price of such fuel on or about the premises other than the signs
specified does not have any substantial relation to public health, morals or other
phases of the general welfare; it unlawfully interferes with and imposes unreasonable
and unnecessary restrictions upon the private business of motor fuel dealers; it thus
deprives them of their property without due process of law in violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution; and is, therefore, unconstitutional).
9. Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235 (1928).
10. The Rein Motors Station commenced operations January 25, 1949. The
effective date of the statute was May 28, 1949. The Act was propounded by the
New Jersey Gasoline Retailers Association, Inc.
11. For cases dealing with gasoline regulations in particular, see, e.g., Alabama
Independent Service Ass'n v. McDowell, 242 Ala. 424, 6 So.2d 502 (1942) ; Sperry
& Hutchinson Co. v. McBride, 307 Mass. 408, 30 N.E.2d 269 (1940); People v.
Victor, 287 Mich. 506, 283 N.W. 666 (1939). Contra: Merit Oil Co. v. Director
of Division of Necessaries of Life, 319 Mas. 301, 65 N.E.2d 529 (1946).
12. 40 So.2d 371 (Fla. 1949).
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monopoly.'3 Similarly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has gone in de-
tail behind the professed purpose of a statute. In Hertz Drivurself Sta-
tions, Inc. v. Siggins"4 that court, examining a statute which required
persons engaged in renting motor vehicles to procure a certificate from
the Public Utility Commission and to fulfill certain prerequisites, went so
far as to find that the statute was sponsored by certain common carriers
and was designed by them to stifle competition.15 It is the function of
courts, when confronted with such a statute, to demand full disclosure of
the legislative background and not to accept as final the legislative declara-
tion as to the purpose served. If this had been done in the Reingold case,
the cloak of "fire hazard" would scarcely have hidden the apparently suc-
cessful attempt to maintain the price of gasoline.
Constitutional Law-Zoning-Elimination of Gasoline Service
Station Which Did Not Conform to Zoning Ordinance Held Not to Be
Unconstitutional Deprivation of Property-In 1939, one year after
petitioner had constructed a gasoline service station, the city passed an ordi-
nance, rezoning the area in which the station was located.' The ordinance
prohibited the further construction of gasoline stations in that zone and
compelled the dissolution of all existing stations by 1949. When the dead-
line arrived, petitioner refused to cease operations and sought to enjoin
the enforcement of the ordinance. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
the lower court's refusal to grant the injunction,2 holding that the city could
require the termination of petitioner's business without compensation, since
it did not conform with the zoning law. Standard Oil Co. v. Tallahassee,
183 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1950).
One of the main problems which arise when a city enacts a zoning
ordinance is the elimination of existing property uses which do not conform
to the new zoning law.3 When zoning ordinances were first proposed, prop-
erty owners were vehemently opposed to any zoning plan which sought to
eliminate non-conforming uses on the ground that the enforced dissolution
of an existing use would be an unconstitutional deprivation of property.4 In
order to avoid this constitutional problem many ordinances specifically ex-
13. Id. at 375-376.
14. 359 Pa. 25, 58 A.2d 464 (1948).
15. Id. at 49-50, 58 A.2d at 480-481.
1. Ordinance 334, Tallahassee, Florida (1939).
2. Standard Oil Co. v. Tallahassee, 87 F. Supp. 145 (N.D. Fla. 1949).
3. The standard terminology for such uses is "non-conforming uses." For a
typical definition of non-conforming uses, see Richmond Va. Zoning Ord. art.
1, § 29 (1948): "Any building or land lawfully occupied by a use at the time of
the effective date of this chapter or amendments thereto which does not conform
after the effective date of this chapter or amendments thereto with the use regulations
of the district in which it is situated."
4. See Noel, Retroactive Zoning and Nuisance, 41 COL. L. REv. 457, 458 (1941).
1951]
1020 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99
empted non-conforming uses from the regulations.5 But in many states the
law makers wanted to eliminate the non-conforming uses immediately. In
some of these states the power of eminent domain was invoked, but this
method was soon discarded inasmuch as it was inefficient and too costly.6
When the non-conforming use is a common law nuisance, it can be term-
inated without resorting to the zoning law.7 However, the courts split when
the non-conforming uses, although not a common law nuisance, has charac-
teristics which cause some definite harm and annoyance. The Supreme
Court has twice held that a legislative pronouncement declaring a certain
type of "noxious" use to be a nuisance was valid and in a particular situation
the Court would not investigate to determine if the use actually was a
nuisance.8 Both of these cases were decided before the era of zoning and
eleven years before the Supreme Court recognized the constitutionality of
zoning.9 Since these early decisions the only Supreme Court cases on
zoning have been confined to the constitutionality of zoning itself and have
made no references to non-conforming uses. 10 In other analogous -cases
involving restrictions on the enjoyment of property the Supreme Court has
weighed the interests involved and prohibited the particular use whenever
the gain to the public by a termination would be substantially greater than
the corresponding loss absorbed by the property owner." Some of the
Federal Circuit Courts and a few state courts have applied the Supreme
Court's reasoning to "noxious," non-conforming uses even where the deter-
mination has been made by a municipal board.'2  Other federal circuit
5. See Note, 39 YALE L.J. 735 (1930); YOKELY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE
253 (1948).
6. See BAssETr, ZONING 26, 27 (1936). Note the British method under the re-
cently enacted Town and Country Planning Act of 1947, 10 Gzo. VI, c. 51, which
permits the local authority to order termination of a non-conforming use (TCPA
§26), but requires that the authority compensate the owner for loss of land value,
damages resulting from disturbance of enjoyment, and expenses incurred in making
the required change (TCPA §27(1)). For an excellent appraisal of the English
Act and a comparison to present day American zoning practice see Land Value
and Land Planning; British Legislation and American Prospects, 60 YALE L.J.
112.
7. See Noel, snpra note 4, at 460.
8. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (brickyard) ; Reinman v. Little
Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915) (livery stable).
9. The Supreme Court first recognized the constitutionality of zoning in Village
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
10. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928) ; Zahn v. Bd. of Public
Works, 274 U.S. 325; Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
11. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (diseased cedar trees which en-
dangered local apple trees ordered cut); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260
U.S. 393 (1922) (Pennsylvania statute which prevented coal company from mining
and causing cave-ins held unconstitutional where company had reserved right to
cause subsidence when selling surface rights, on basis that public welfare did not
justify the loss which the company would incur); cf. United States v. Causby, 328
U.S. 256 (1946).
12. Texas Co. v. City of Tampa, 100 F.2d 347 (5th Cir. 1939) (gasoline sta-
tion); Marblehead Land Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 47 F.2d 528 (9th Cir. 1931),
cert. denied, 284 U.S. 634 (1931) (oil drilling) ; Knowles v. Central Allapattae
Properties, 145 Fla. 123, 198 So. 819 (1940) (dog hospital and cemetery); Finkel-
stein v. Sapulpa, 106 Okla. 297, 234 Pac. 187 (1925) (junk yard).
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courts and most of the state courts have decreed that the legislative pro-
nouncement is not final and that non-conforming uses cannot be eliminated
unless the use is actually a common law nuisance. 1 3  In all of the states,
uses which are not detrimental and whose only harm is of a speculative and
intangible nature have been permitted to continue. 14 Gasoline stations gen-
erally are included in this category.1 Only in Louisiana have the courts
countenanced uncompensated termination of these so-called "harmless"
non-conforming uses, on the theory that a mere continuation of any non-
conforming use in defiance of a zoning ordinance constitutes a nuisance.' 6
Other states, generally finding it impossible io abolish non-conforming uses
immediately, attempted to obtain a gradual elimination by prohibiting any
alterations, repairs or expansion,' 7 but these restrictions were unsuccessful
and the non-conforming uses continued to thrive and exist. s
Recently, city planners, in search for a method which would be both
lawful and effective, devised the plan of "amortization".' 9 This method
permits a temporary continuation of non-conforming uses and allows their
elimination only after the expiration of a specified period of time. It
appears that this method provides the most equitable way for reconciling
the conflicting interests. Since new competition is prohibited by the ordi-
nance, the entrepreneur obtains monopoly privileges, and the increased
profits can speed the recoupment of the investment. Perhaps the city can
aid the entrepreneur by granting tax benefits, and, by establishing a mini-
mum and maximum time period, the city can also allow variations in each
situation to permit the entrepreneur to minimize his losses. Very few
states have adopted this method, and its constitutionality remains un-
tested 0 Although the ordinance in the instant case did provide for amor-
tization the court did not base its decision on that ground, and in fact did
not even mention that clause in its opinion. It succinctly held, in opposi-
tion to the overwhelming majority view, that the state, in the exercise of
its police power, may prohibit any use of property which violates the zoning
ordinance.
21
13. Oklahoma City v. Dolese, 48 F.2d 367 (10th Cir. 1931) (storing and sell-
ing coal, gravel, sand, stone, etc.); Simon v. City of Cleveland Heights, 46 Ohio
App. 234, 188 N.E. 308 (1933) (chicken slaughtering).
14. Standard Oil Co. v. Bowling Green, 244 Ky. 362, 50 S.W.2d 960 (1932)
(gasoline station) ; Jones v. Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 304, 295 Pac. 14 (1930) (sani-
torium); Adams v. Kalamazoo Ice and Fuel Co., 245 Mich. 261, 221 N.W. 86
(ice company).
15. Standard Oil Co. v. Bowling Green, 244 Ky. 362, 50 S.W.2d 960 (1932);
Sandenburgh v. Michigame Oil Co., 249 Mich. 372, 228 N.W. 707 (1930); contra,
Texas Co. v. City of Tampa, 100 F.2d 347 (5th Cir. 1939).
16. State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. McDonald, 168 La. 172, 121 So. 613 (1929),
cert. denied, 280 U.S. 556 (1929) (grocery store); Liberty Dress Shop v. New
Orleans, 157 La. 26, 101 So. 798 (1924) (dress shop).
17. See Note, 39 YALE L.J. 735, 736 (1931).
18. See Note, 9 U. of CHI. L. Rzv. 477, 479 (1942).
19. See note 17 mtpra.
20. Only the Illinois statute expressly authorizes amortization. IL.. REv. STAT.
c. 24, § 73-1 (1945). For examples of ordinances which permit "amortization" see
Note, 35 VA. L. REv. 355, 356 (1949).
21. Instant case at 412.
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While the continuation of non-conforming uses was permitted in the
past on the ground that the value to be gained by eliminating them was too
insignificant to warrant the losses which would have been incurred,2
2 it
now appears that the presence of any non-conforming uses will endanger
the community benefits to be derived from the zoning plan.23  However,
precedent and the harshness of a rule which would require the immediate
extinguishment of all non-conforming uses make it doubtful that the courts
would uphold zoning ordinances which adopt such a rule. The extreme
view of the instant case which does not distinguish between "noxious"
and "harmless" non-conforming uses has only been accepted in Louisiana.
24
The only practical solution appears to be the method of amortization. How-
ever the few cities which have adopted this method have rendered it value-
less by allowing extremely long periods for amortization and thereby post-
poning any material benefits to the distant future. 25 Since the constitu-
tionality of amortization is an open question, it is unfortunate that the
instant court did not investigate this feature of the ordinance. Instead, the
court, by basing its decision on the right of a state to eliminate any non-
conforming use, has greatly decreased the constitutional protection usually
granted to property owners.
Federal Tort Claims Act-Liability of the Government to Service-
men for Injuries Incident to Service-The broad reforms of the Federal
Tort Claims Act of 1946,1 which permits recovery for any injury caused
by the negligent or wrongful act of any employee of the government,2 seem
at first reading to be applicable to civilians and servicemen alike. Yet the
courts have been doubtful. The Supreme Court granted recovery for the
death of a soldier in an accident which was "not incident to service," i.e.,
22. See Jones v. Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 304, 311, 295 Pac. 14, 17-18 (1930).
23. See BARTuOLOmmV, URBAN LAND USES AND ZONING, DES MoINEs, IowA
44 (1939) ; Bartholomew, The Zoning of Illinois Municipalities, 17 ILL. MUNIc. REv.
221, 232 (1930). In the latter article it is stated, "One further matter should be
given early consideration. That is the subject of non-conforming uses. It has al-
ways been assumed that non-conforming uses would gradually eliminate themselves
from the district in which they exist if they were not permitted to expand. Such
has not proven to be the case. They not merely continue to exist, but to send
down deeper roots. They become clear monopolies and special privileges. Their
existence is a continual threat to the conservation of property values in the districts
where they exist. The time has come when cognizance should be taken of this
situation and provision made, probably in the state law, whereby non-conforming
uses may be gradually eliminated under some equitable method of procedure."
24. See note 15 mpra.
25. E.g., Chicago, Ill. Zoning Ord. § 20 (1944) (50-100 years, depending on type
of construction) ; Richmond, Va. Zoning Ord., art. XIII, § 1 (1948) (20-40 years).
1. 60 STAT. 843 (1946), as amended, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680 (1949).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1346a(2). "It seems crystal clear that the claims here in suit
fall literally within the comprehensive words . . . of the Act." United States v.
Brooks, 169 F.2d 840, 842 (1948), rev'd, Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949).
See Parker, C.J. (dissenting) in United States v. Brooks, sipra at 847; Griggs v.
United States, 178 F.2d, 1,2-3 (10th cir., 1949), revd, instant case, note 7 infra.
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while the soldier was on furlough; 3 but the Court expressly reserved
opinion as to whether the Act imposed liability for injuries which might be
deemed "incident to service." Subsequently the Circuits split on the latter
question in cases involving the death of one soldier in a barracks fire caused
by a defective heating unit,4 the death of another soldier through the negli-
gence of an operating army surgeon,5 and the permanent disability of a third
as a result of a negligently performed operation. 6 After hearing appeals
in these three cases together, the Supreme Court denied recovery in each
case, on the ground that the Act does not impose liability for servicemen's
injuries incurred incident to service.
7
The history of the Act affords no support for this decision, although
it appears that Congress was cognizant of the issue. A tentative draft of
the Act 8 included an exception to government liability regarding claims
compensable under the World War Veterans' Act of 1924,9 but this was
omitted from the final draft; and of the eighteen tort claims bills introduced
in Congress between 1925 and 1935, all but two contained exceptions ex-
cluding relief to servicemen.10 From this it is arguable that Congress
deliberately declined to narrow liability further than the Act expressly
states. That the Act was passed during a time when servicemen's problems
were spotlighted adds weight to the argument."
In rejecting the plain language of the Act, the courts have been swayed
by supposed policy considerations. They have said that servicemen are
afforded comprehensive benefits and pensions under other statutes; 12 that
although the Act was designed to eliminate the press of private bills in
Congress for relief, it was not directed at servicemen's claims since such
claims had never been common; 13 that the entire government-serviceman
relationship is peculiar and special and not comparable to that existing be-
tween government and civilian. 14  Such arguments, however, apply with
3. Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949).
4. Feres v. United States, 177 F.2d 535 (2nd Cir. 1949).
5. Griggs v. United States, 178 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1949).
6. Jefferson v. United States, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949), affirming 77 F. Supp.
706 (Md. 1948) (towel left within the abdomen during surgery).
7. Feres v. United States, Jefferson v. United States, United States v. Griggs,
71 Sup. Ct. 153 (1950).
8. "Any claim for which compensation is provided by . . . the World War
Veterans' Act of 1924. . . ." H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1945).
9. 43 STAT. 607, 38 U.S.C. §421 (1925).
10. These bills are collected in Brooks v. United States mtpra at 51, n.2 and 3.
11. "It would be absurd to believe that Congress did not have the servicemen
in mind in 1946, when this statute was passed. Brooks v. United States, mtpra at 51.
"The Act was passed at a time when the country was deeply conscious of
the rights and claims of soldiers." Parker, C.J. (dissenting) in United States
v. Brooks, supra at 847.
12. Jefferson v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 706, 711 n.1 (Md. 1948) ; instant case
at 158.
13. Jefferson v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 706, 712-713 (Md. 1948); instant
case at 156.
14. "Perhaps no relation between the Government and a citizen is more dis-
tinctively federal in character than that between it and members of its armed forces."
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 305 (1947). This language has been
approved in United States v. Brooks, stpra at 842; Jefferson v. United States,
178 F.2d 518, 520 (4th Cir. 1949) ; instant case at 158.
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equal force to all servicemen's injuries, irrespective of their incidence to
service. 15 The core of these arguments seems to be a vague belief that the
allowance of claims for injuries incident to service would adversely affect
military morale and discipline.'" There appears to be a fear that govern-
ment liability would place injurious pressure on officers and cause hesita-
tion when rapid judgments are necessary, would bring into the open matters
of internal discipline, and would spotlight errors made by unit commanders
in the discharge of their duties. Finally, there seems to be an apprehension
that administrative difficulties, caused by the absence of soldiers from their
posts for extended intervals while they testify as claimant or witness, would
result in a general disruption of the functioning of a military post.
It is conceivable that morale and discipline would be imperiled if the
government faced suit for each injury to a serviceman. It is even remotely
possible that a commander's judgment might be influenced by this factor-
if it were not that the Act specifically excepts claims based upon the per-
formance of a discretionary function.' 7 More pressing is the possibility
of guardhouse barratry; but exhaustive hospital and duty records and the
acumen of investigating officers should minimize this danger. Further-
more, not nearly all of the injuries to servicemen would be compensable
under the Act, for it excludes claims arising out of combatant activities
during time of war, or arising in foreign countries, or arising out of assault,
battery, malicious prosecution, and certain other willful torts.' 8 These
limitations on liability should avert the threatened catastrophe.
With regard to the narrow remaining area of claims which arise from
negligence, an analysis of the Act and a knowledge of military life throws
doubt on the validity of the courts' fears. In the first place, the Act pro-
vides that all claims for less than $1,000 may be handled by an administra-
tive agency.'" It is likely that most claims will be within this figure, since
an injured serviceman usually incurs no medical expenses and suffers no
loss of wages. Aside from permanent disability and death claims, only
mental suffering would ordinarily be compensable. It is further likely that
most legitimate claims would be settled by the agency without suit. With
only permanent disability and death claims reaching court, the flood of
15. "And the Federal Tort Claims Act, as we interpret it, either excludes . . .
soldiers altogether or completely includes them." United States v. Brooks, .rupra
at 845.
16. "It is easy to conjure up the unfortunate results, including the subversion of
military discipline, if soldiers could sue the United States for injuries incurred by
reason of their being in the armed forces of their country . . . the traditional grous-
ing of the American soldier would result in the devastation of military discipline
and morale." United States v. Brooks, supra at 845, and criticised by Parker,
C.J. (dissenting) at 850.
"If this were so, the civil courts would be required to pass upon the pro-
priety of military decisions and essential military discipline would be impaired by
subjecting the command to the public criticism and rebuke of any member of the
armed forces who chose to bring a suit against the United States." Jefferson v. United
States, 178 F.2d 518, 520 (1949).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 2680a (1948).
18. 28 U.S.C. § 2680j, § 2680k, 2680h (1948).
19. 28 U.S.C. §2672 (1948).
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litigation which the courts imagine would be little more than a trickle.
There would be some administrative inconvenience when soldiers were
absent from their posts, but the small amount of such inconvenience would
not be burdensome. There might also be some embarrassment to com-
manders when internal unit problems are aired in open court, but hardly
enough to disrupt discipline and threaten commands. It would indeed be
surprising if government liability for such injuries exerted any pressure
whatsoever on service leaders.
Whatever minor inconveniences would follow government liability for
injuries incident to service, they are far outweighed by the stated public
policy of putting an end, as far as possible, to governmental immunity.
Speculative considerations of administrative inconvenience and disruption
of morale and discipline should not control judicial decisions where, as here,
the claims fall squarely within the statute. The Court justified its judicial
legislation by saying that Congress could change the Act if the Court's
interpretation were wrong. It hardly seems the function of the Court to
abrogate the plain provisions of an Act of Congress on the assumption that
Congress doesn't mean what it says. To military men the shocking result
of the Court's dubious distinction between injuries incident and not incident
to service is that recovery will be denied for injuries to soldiers on duty,
but will be allowed for the same injuries to soldiers on furlough and even
to those who are absent without leave or are deserters.
Inheritance and Estate Taxation-Joint Tenancy-Taxability in
Deceased Husband's Estate of Property Purchased by Surviving
Wife With Income from Property Previously Acquired from Hus-
band by Gift-During his lifetime A. C. Harvey from time to time
made gifts of stocks, bonds, and real estate to his wife, Elizabeth. Prior
to marriage she had no property of her own; during marriage she re-
ceived no substantial income from personal earnings, nor any large gifts
from anyone except her husband. However, she invested the property
received from her husband successfully, and with the income and profits
purchased other property. At A. C. Harvey's death she and her husband
owned in joint tenancy' stocks, bonds, and real estate worth $200,000. Of
the total amount so owned, Elizabeth asserted that she had furnished the
consideration for $150,000 in value, and traced such consideration to in-
come from the property received from her husband by gift. Accordingly
she contended that only one-fourth of the jointly owned property was in-
cludible in her husband's estate. The Government asserted, however, that
1. With right of survivorship. Throughout this comment, it will be understood
that wherever the term "joint tenancy" or "joint tenants" is used, a tenancy with
right of survivorship, including tenancy by the entirety, is referred to. Whether a
tenancy is one in common or with right of survivorship is determined by the agree-
ment of the parties in the light of the applicable state law. Only the pro rata part
of a tenancy in common is includible in a tenant-in-common's gross estate.
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inasmuch as the funds for the purchase had, in the first instance, been ac-
quired from the husband, the entire $200,000 was includible in his gross
estate.2 Elizabeth paid the tax deficiency of $32,000, and filed claim for
refund. Rejecting the Government's argument that property "received or
acquired" from the donor includes the income therefrom, the court of
appeals affirmed a district court judgment in Elizabeth's favor, and held
that no part of the $150,000 attributable to Elizabeth's contributions were
includible in the gross estate. Elizabeth C. Harvey, Exec. v. United States,
185 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1950), affirming 86 F.Supp. 609 (D.Ill. 1949).
Unlike many of the state inheritance tax laws,3 the Internal Revenue
Code 4 requires the full value of jointly owned property to be included in
the gross estate of a decedent unless the surviving tenant can prove that
such property was purchased with his own money. For this purpose the
purchase money is considered the decedent's if it was, at any time, re-
ceived from the decedent by "gift" (gift includes not only the common
law variety, but any transfer for less than an adequate and full considera-
tion in money or money's worth). This provision of the Code applies
to any form of joint tenancy with right of survivorship, but does not in-
clude tenancy in common.5 Application of the Code can best be explained
by several examples:
Illustration 1.-H, with funds acquired by inheritance or from personal
earnings purchased property worth $100,000, taking title in joint tenancy
with W. The entire $100,000 must be included in H's estate at his death.6
If W survives H, the $100,000 will also be taxable in her estate; but if H
is the survivor, no part of the $100,000 will be includible in W's estate.
Illustration 2.-H made a gift to W of $100,000 "no strings attached."
W invested the money in government bonds, taking title in her own name.
Several years later she decided, on the suggestion of a friend, and without
consulting her husband, to convey the bonds to herself and H as joint
tenants. As a result of this conveyance, the full $100,000 will be includible
in H's estate, notwithstanding that H paid a gift tax on the transfer to
W; and that W paid a gift tax on the later transfer to herself and H as
joint tenants.
7
2. Under INT. REv. CODE, § 811(e).
3. E.g., Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 2301(e) (Purdon, 1949); Wis-
consin, Wis STAT. § 72.01(6) (1947).
4. § 811 (e) requires that there be included in the gross estate of a decedent the
value at the time of his death of all property "to the extent of the interest therein
held as joint tenants by the decedent and any other person . . . except such part
thereof as may be shown to have originally belonged to such other person and
never to have been received or acquired by the latter from the decedent for less
than an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth ..
5. U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.22.
6. Id., § 81.22. However, if the surviving tenant is a spouse, the full impact of
the tax will be mitigated by the marital deduction. Id., § 81.47a (b) (i).
7. Dimock v. Corwin, sub nom. United States v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 363 (1939);
Hornor's Estate, 130 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1942) ; Stuart v. Hassett, 41 F. Supp. 905
(D. Mass. 1941) ; Elizabeth F. Bowditch, 23 B.T.A. 1266 (1931). Contra: McCrady
v. Heiner, 19 F. Supp. 575 (W.D. Pa. 1937).
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Illustration 3.-H and W have a joint bank account. Prior to 1930
W owned certain stock on which she received dividends of $3,000 per year.
These dividends were deposited in the joint account. H died in 1941, and
at that time W could show that total deposits made in the account from
1930 to 1941 were $145,000, and that $33,000 of this amount came from
her dividends. The balance in the account at H's death is $8,000. W can-
not prove that the $8,000 remaining in the account is attributable to her
$33,000 of deposits. The entire $8,000 is therefore taxable in the estate
of H.8
Illustration 4.-W, with $100,000 received by inheritance from her
father, purchases property and has title conveyed to herself and H as joint
tenants. If H pre-deceases W, no part of the property will be includible
in his gross estate, since he did not at any time furnish the consideration
for the purchase of the property; but at W's death, the entire value of the
property will be includible in her estate.
Illustration 5.-W's father, instead of making a gift of $100,000 to W,
as in Illustration 4, conveyed Blackacre, valued at $100,000, to H and W
as joint tenants. In this situation one-half of the full value of Blackacre
will be included in the gross estate of H if he predeceases W; similarly, one-
half will be included in the gross estate of W if she predeceases H. The fuU
value will thereafter be taxed in the estate of the survivor.
In Dintock v. Corwin 9 it was settled, that a conveyance by a wife to
herself and husband as joint tenants of property previously acquired by
gift from her husband would subject the full value of the property to tax
in the husband's estate. Prior to the instant case the Treasury Depart-
ment has contended that no distinction should be made between income
and principal in tracing the original source of the consideration paid for
jointly owned property. The Department's theory seems to be that the
income "is merely the fruit of the tree and possesses the same fatal char-
acteristics of having its origin in a gift from the decedent." 10 It has per-
sisted in this view notwithstanding a prior decision of the Tax Court to
the contrary..' An awkward attempt was made in the instant case to dis-
tinguish the Tax Court decision on the ground that profits from the sale
of shares must be treated as derived from the shares, even if dividend
income is not.
It is evident from the above illustrations and the cited decisions that
under some circumstances a high price may be paid tax-wise for the con-
.venience of taking title to property as joint tenants. In the instant case
the wife was fortunate in having sufficient records to prove the source of
her contributions. Many taxpayers, less farsighted, who own property in
joint tenancy are, without knowing it, playing the game with the Govern-
ment on a "heads you win, tails I lose" basis.
8. Estate of Howard, 9 T.C. 1192 (1947).
9. See note 7 supra.
10. Willis, Joint Tenancy and the Estate Taz, 22 CALiF. S.B.J. 492, 494 (1947).
11. See note 8 supra.
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That § 811(e) of the Code is not well coordinated with the full
scheme of estate and gift taxation is. fairly apparent. In view of all that
has been said in recent years about taxation being a practical matter, it
hardly makes sense that a mere form in the change of ownership should
bring such drastic tax consequences as occurred, for example, in illustra-
tion 2,12 and as would have occurred in the instant case if the wife had
not been able to prove the source of her money. Section 811(e) was first
enacted in essentially its present form 13 in 1916. Notwithstanding that
since that time a gift tax has been imposed, nearly all other sections of the
law relating to taxable transfers have been drastically overhauled, and pro-
vision has been made for allowance of a marital deduction, § 811(e) re-
mains virtually unchanged. Several responsible organizations have urged
amendment.14 Considering all aspects of the problem it would seem that
a plan of taxing only the proportionate part of a joint tenant's interest,
similar to the plan followed by-such states as Pennsylvania and Wisconsin,
would operate with greater fairness than the present statute.'
5
Labor-Management--"Codetermination" in West German Indus-
try*-The "codetermination" law,' passed recently by the West German
Bundestag, 2 provides that the boards of directors of all coal and steel com-
panies shall be composed of eleven members, five representing stock-
holders, five representing the trade unions, and one "independent." 2 a A
complex procedure is established for choosing the "independent" member
by negotiation and arbitration, the stockholders retaining the power to make
12. See, Stuart v. Hassett, supra note 7. W, in 1908, had acquired realty in her
sole name by conveyance from T. Her husband furnished the purchase money paid
to T. Eighteen years later W conveyed to herself and her husband as joint tenants.
Notwithstanding the long interval of sole ownership by the wife, the statute was
held to require the inclusion ot the full value of the property in the husband's estate.
13. Revenue Act of 1916, § 202 39 STAT. 777 (1916).
14. See, e.g., the joint study prepared by the Advisory Committe to the Treasury
Department entitled Federal Estate and Gift Taxes, A Proposal for Integration and
for Correlation With Income Tax.
15. See note 3, supra.
* Contributed by F. B. Haas, Jr., third year student, University of Pennsylvania
Law School.
1. The right of codetermination, or more accurately the right "to have a voice"
(Mitbestimmungsrecht) denotes to the German trade unionist something much broader
than a law requiring labor representation on boards of directors. It means generally'
labor's right to participate in the total planning of national economic policy, of which
director representation is but one important phase. See White, Co-Determination,
Keystone of Labor Union Policy, Information Bulletin, Office of U. S. High Com-
missioner For Germany, December, 1950. Subsequent to the completion of this
comment an interesting selection of the opinions of German union and industry
leaders appeared in Newsweek, May 14, 1951, p. 86, col. 1.
2. Bill of April 10, 1951. Citations herein based on unofficial translation by
U.S. Dep't of State.
2a. Id., f[ 4, § 1.
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the selection in the event of ultimate deadlock3 Discussed here are some
of the unique legal problems raised by such a statute, whether considered
in its Continental setting or with reference to American law.
In Germany, labor participation in limited aspects of management im-
posed by legislative fiat is not a new development. The German trade
unions have always been closely allied to political parties,4 and have sought
to obtain more favorable working conditions, higher wages, and other labor
objectives primarily by recourse to legislation rather than by bargaining
directly with employers. This tendency has resulted in a considerable body
of detailed statutory regulation with a correspondingly limited area about
which to bargain collectively.5 One of the most significant manifestations
of the political influence of the trade unions was the Works Councils Act
of 1920,0 providing that in each "establishment" normally employing more
than twenty persons there should be constituted a Works Council elected
by the employees. Innovations introduced by the legislation included pro-
visions (1) permitting the Councils to dispute the discharge of any em-
ployee and to appeal such cases to a statutory tribunal whose decision was
final; (2) requiring employers to submit to the Councils detailed reports
of the financial condition of the enterprise; 7 (3) requiring Works Coun-
cil representation on the Control Boards of those enterprises having such
bodies; 8 and (4) delegating to the Councils the duty of supervising the
observance of collective labor agreements. Although such councils were
revived after World War II with the sanction of Allied occupation authori-
ties,9 the enactment of a codetermination law, involving a considerable but
logical extension of the principle embodied in the Works Councils Acts, has
been the chief objective of the trade unions.' 0
In contrast to the legislative "interventionism" characteristic of Euro-
pean labor law generally, labor legislation in the United States rests on
the theory that the details of the employer-employee relationship should be
3. Id., 6. In brief the procedure is that if the ten stockholder and trade union
directors fail to agree on the "independent" member, they will appoint a committee
of four, two stockholder and two trade union representatives, to nominate three
men to the stockholders' committee for approval. If the stockholders' committee
fails to select one of these nominees, and the local Court of Justice finds the refusal
justified, the same procedure is repeated. If it fails again, the stockholders' com-
mittee will make the final selection.
4. Kelly, The Reconstitictiom of the Germn Trade Union Movemenzt, 64 POL
Sci. Q. 24, 45 (1949).
5. Lehman, Collective Labor Law Under the German Republic, 10 Wis. L.
Rav. 324 (1935).
6. Law of February 4, 1920, [1920] REICH GESETZBLATT 26.. Text in GuIu=a-
BAUD, TnE WORKS COUNCIL, A GERAN EXPERIMENT IN INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY
249 (1928).
7. Implemented by Law of February 5, 1921, [1921] RaIcHsGEsE'rzrLATT 17;
GUILLEBAUD, op. cit. mtpra note 6, at 281.
8. Implemented by law of February 15, 1922, [1922] RxICHSaESETZBLATr 17;
GUILLEBAUD, op. cit. mpra note 6, at 282. Control Boards supervised the execution
of policies determined by the boards of directors.
9. Allied Control Council Law No. 22, International Labor Office, Legislative
Series, 1946, Germany No. 3.
10. White, supra note 1.
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determined through the medium of free collective bargaining contracts be-
tween the employer and his employees. Although there has been a trend
in recent years toward "interventionism," marked principally by Social
Security, Workmen's Compensation, and Wage and Hour Laws, "volun-
tarism" remains the underlying principle by which labor attempts to
achieve its objectives by bargaining directly with employers. Consistent
with this approach is the persisting effort by the unions to obtain legis-
lation facilitating labor organization and expanding the scope of collective
bargaining to include more matters about which employers have a duty to
bargain." Labor has obtained a voice in the actual determination of man-
agement policy only through collective bargaining or by concessions of a
benevolent employer.'
2
The role of collective bargaining in industries with codetermined man-
agement poses a perplexing problem. When labor's voice on the board of
directors approaches equality with that of the owners of the enterprise, the
exertion of economic pressure by means of strikes or boycotts by the union
becomes anomalous. This would be true whether the resulting contract
were to include the voluntary agreement of the parties on most of the
details of the employer-employee relationship, as in the United States, or
whether many, but not all, of the terms of the agreement were to be made
mandatory by statute, as is generally true on the Continent. The labor
agreement is in reality a compromise which reflects the economic staying
power of the respective parties with regard to terms and conditions of
employment which can be agreed upon voluntarily under applicable law.
When the antagonists become fused on the management level, the reflec-
tion of the economic power of the parties becomes more or less distorted
depending upon the degree of equality maintained on the board of direc-
tors. Even if collective bargaining would not appear to be inconsistent with
limited minority labor representation in management, the equality achieved
by the trade unions under the new German law would seem to render the
union-management contract obsolete as a means of reconciling the differ-
ences of labor and private owners.' 3
Another difficult problem raised by the fusion of labor and ownership
interests on the management level of private industry is the maintenance of
competition between codetermined companies. The Supreme Court of the
United States has recognized recently, in Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union
No. 3,14 that cooperation between organized labor and employers may be
11. Thus, the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 STAT. 136, 29 U.S.C.
§§158a(5), 159a (Supp. 1947), requires employers to bargain ". . . in respect
to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employ-
ment . . ." This has been held to include pension and retirement plans. Inland
Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960
(1948).
12. See McCORMIcK, THE PowER OF PEOPLE-MULTIPLE MANAGEMENT UP TO
DATE (1949).
13. Nationalization presents an analogous problem. The role of collective bar-
gaining in nationalized industry is discussed in Note. Industrial Natioa-lization and
Industrial Relations in Great Britain, 97 U. OF PA. L. REv. 543 (1949).
14. 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
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an effective means for achieving market strangulation. In the Allen Bradley
case the union, the manufacturers of electrical equipment, and the electrical
contractors in the New York metropolitan area combined to allocate mar-
kets, fix prices, and effectively exclude all outsiders from competing in the
area embraced in the conspiracy. The manufacturers and contractors
reaped tremendous profits, and labor received commensurately high wages,
all to the detriment of the consuming public, which was forced to pay
exorbitant monopoly prices. The court granted an injunction under the
Sherman Act prohibiting the union from further restrictive practices.
As this case cogently illustrates, the consuming public suffers no less
from restrictive trade practices because perpetrated with labor cooperation. 15
In any industry in which the same union represents the workers in com-
peting companies, codetermination offers clear opportunities for monopolis-
tic abuses.' 6 This problem is made particularly acute by the German act
under consideration, which provides that only two of the five labor repre-
sentatives on the boards must be employees of the company involved.l1a
It should be noted that the German codetermination law will become effec-
tive in a free market area unique in European history. The Schuman
Plan,17 embracing the West German Republic, has as its ostensible purpose
the creation of a free market in coal and steel in an area which was highly
cartelized before World War II. The six big pre-war German steel
combines have been broken up into twenty-eight firms by Allied decarteliza-
tion orders. - With the codetermination law in operation in these com-
panies the combined boards of directors could have a total of 84 members-
at-large from the German trade unions, 3 on each board, plus 56 directors
from the employees of the individual companies, 2 on each board. These
German companies, it is envisaged, will compete on an individual basis with
the private steel companies of the other member nations. The German steel
industry is in a position of potential dominance of the continental market
because of its size and its proximity to available coal supplies. If important
15. "We know that Congress feared the concentrated power of business organi-
zations to dominate markets and prices. It intended to outlaw business monopolies.
A business monopoly is no less such because a union participates, and such partici-
pation is a violation of the [Sherman] Act." Black, J. in Allen Bradley Co. v. Local
Union No. 3, I.B.E.W., 325 U.S. 797, 811 (1945).
16. "It is especially the powerful international unions who are in strategic posi-
tions to impose unreasonable restraints on commerce. . . ." Frankfurter, J. dis-
senting in United Brotherhood of C. & J. of A. v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 415
(1947).
16a. Bill, supra note 2, 1 6, § 1.
17. Text of Schuman Plan proposals, N.Y. Times, May 11, 1950, p. 11, col. 3.
Also in 19 Current History 45 (1950).
It is not within the scope of this discussion to consider the many political im-
plications of the Schuman Plan. Proponents of the plan have contended that by
eliminating tariff barriers and national subsidies, and by giving adequate enforce-
ment powers to the international High Authority, production can be rationalized
and a healthy competition maintained among the coal and steel companies of the
member nations.
18. N.Y. Times, April 3, 1951, p. 1, col. 5.
1951]
1032 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99
segments of this industry act in concert to achieve monopoly advantages,
whether the motivating force be worker security, high wages, favorable
working conditions for labor, or the traditional cartel rewards for private
owners, the consuming public must bear the concomitant disadvantages
which flow from monopoly: high price and limited supply.
Nationality-Loss of American Citizenship by Reason of Vot-
ing in Occupation-Sponsored Election in Japan-Ever since the Act
of 1868,1 it has been a cardinal tenet of American law that the citizen shall
have the right to expatriate himself without the consent of the sov-
ereign; 2 but while this principle of unilateral denationalization has been
universally conceded, the manner in which it might be accomplished has
been a matter in dispute. It was the traditional view that a voluntary
renunciation, requiring a conscious desire for denationalization on the part
of the citizen, was essential.3 However, with the passage of the Nationality
Act of 1940,- which sets forth eight specific acts equivalent in law to
expatriation, 5 a new, though not entirely unprecedented,3 approach has
been taken. Thus, it is the modem view that expatriation is a sort of
penalty to be meted out to any citizen committing one of the proscribed
acts, regardless of his intent to divest himself of American nationality, or
the lack of it.7 This new rationale stands in sharp contrast with the tradi-
tional view in that it includes within its scope the merely ill-informed or
ignorant citizen who commits one of the overt acts unconscious of its
consequences. It is, therefore, replete with possibilities of injustice, a
recent example of which was provided by the plight of a number of Ameri-
can citizens resident in Japan.
1. 15 STAT. 223 (1868), 8 U.S.C. § 800 (1946).
2 Prior to the Act of 1868 the Courts took the view of the common law that
expatriation required the permission of the sovereign. Shanks v. Dupont, 3 Pet. 242,
246 (U.S. 1830) and see 2 HYDE, INTERNATioxAL LAW § 378 (2d ed. 1945).
3. Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 334 (1939); 2 HYDE, op. cit. supra, § 376.
4. 54 STAT. 1137-1174 (1940), 8 U.S.C. §§ 501-907 (1946).
5. 54 STAT. 1168 (1940), 8 U.S.C. § 801 (1946).
6. Section 3 of the Act of 1907, 34 STAT. 1228 (1907), provided that a woman
marrying a foreigner should take the nationality of her husband. This provision
was in the nature of a penalty since it applied whether or not the woman desired to
divest herself of U.S. citizenship, MacKenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915). It is
enough if the citizen intends to do one of the proscribed acts.
7. Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U.S. 491 (1950), following, under the Act
of 1940, the rule laid down in MacKenzie v. Hare, supra note 6, under the Act of
1907. The adoption of this view was almost inevitable since (1) Congress provided
that any citizen who performed one of the proscribed acts shall lose his nationality
and no mention whatsoever is made of the expatriate's state of mind (2) it would
be administratively impossible for the State Department to enforce any more imagina-
tive provision.
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Many American nationals of Japanese descent were stranded in
Japan by the outbreak of war in 1941; and most of these were still there
in April of 1946, when the Occupying Powers sponsored an election for a
Diet to write a new Japanese Constitution. Because they possessed dual
nationality and because they believed that the American proconsul, Gen-
eral MacArthur, had called upon them to do so, 8 about seven hundred of
these 9 voted in the election. When the Department of State learned of
this, it ruled that regardless of their patriotic motives, they had forfeited
their American citizenship under § 401 (e) 10 of the Nationality Act, which
provides that "a person who is a national of the United States . . . shall
lose his nationality by . . . voting in a political election in a foreign
state." Several of those affected then instituted actions against Dean
Acheson, as Secretary of State, seeking decrees that they had not lost
their citizenship thereby. The discovery of a formula by which their
prayers for relief might be granted, and by which the determination of
the State Department might be overruled, has provided a difficult problem
for the Courts.
By far the easiest means of avoiding the application of § 401(e) has
been to find that the complainants acted under a form of duress when they
went to the polls. In the contemplation of the law, this would mean that
they had performed no act at all. In practice, this loop-hole has been the
one most commonly employed to preserve the nationality of the Japanese-
Americans. In several cases courts have been able to rule that when these
citizens voted, they did so solely because they feared loss of their ration
cards if they failed to do so." This has been at once a proper and a
happy disposition of the cases. Once started upon this approach, however,
the courts have pushed it beyond its orthodox bounds. Thus, in Kai v.
Acheson' a woman who voted merely because she was urged to do so
by members of her family and because the social climate of her locality
favored it, was held to have done so under coercion. Such an extension
of the doctrine of duress appears unwarranted in law, but it is scarcely
8. "Prior to the election she had read in the newspapers and had heard over the
radio statements by authorized representatives of General MacArthur's Headquarters
urging the women to vote in order to democratize the country in the same manner
as the United States. . . . No distinction was made either in the publicity or in
her own mind between American-born women and Japanese women." Kai v. Acheson,
94 F. Supp. 383, 384 (S.D. Cal. 1950). Other cases are to much the same effect.
9. American Civil Liberties Union, Monthly Bulletin, May, 1949, cited in
Roche, The Loss of Amnerican Nationality, 99 U. OF PA. L. REv. 25, 54.
10. 54 STAT. 1168-1169 (1940), 8 U.S.C. §801(e) (1946).
11. Ouye v. Acheson, 91 F. Supp. 129 (Hawaii 1950) ; Tsunashima v. Acheson,
83 F. Supp. 473 (S.D. Cal. 1949); Yamamoto v. Acheson, 93 F. Supp. 346 (Ariz.
1950) ; Rokui v. Acheson, 94 F. Supp. 439 (S.D. Cal. 1950) ; Seki v. Acheson and
Yada v. Acheson, 94 F. Supp. 438 (S.D. Cal. 1950).
12. 94 F. Supp. 383 (S.D. Cal. 1950) This case is paralleled by cases holding
that Nisei who renounced their United States citizenship at relocation centers during
the war were coerced into doing so by the extreme social pressure there in evidence,
Murakami v. Acheson, 176 F.2d 953 (9th Cir. 1949) ; Inouye v. Clark, 73 F. Supp.
1000 (S.D. Cal. 1947).
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shocking in a good cause. Despite this distortion it can be said that as
long as the courts have contented themselves with extraordinary findings
of "duress", there has been little to complain of in the judicial handling
of the Japanese-American nationality cases.
The extended doctrine of "duress", however, has not been adequate
to provide the desired result in all cases. Elastic as it has proved to be,
the "duress" approach has been unable to cover those cases where the
citizens were under a mistake for the elementary reason that mistake
cannot be equated to duress. To accommodate cases involving nothing
more than mistake, it has been necessary to evolve a more sophisticated
rationale. This has been provided by cases denying that Japan is a
"foreign state" within the meaning of the Nationality Act. Thus, in
Arikawa v. Acheson ' 8 it was decided that Japan, far from being a "foreign
state," is a sort of dependency of the United States. Such a holding is at
best doubtful. From the earliest times it has been held that Ameri-
can-occupied territories do not become parts of the United States.1
4
Consonant with this view, it has been recently held that Saipan'15 and
Okinawa 1 were "foreign countries" within the meaning of the Federal
Tort Claims Act during the period when they were under sole American
control.
While the Arikawa case appeared to hold that Japan was not "for-
eign" to the United States, a more recent case has provided a less patently
ridiculous variation upon the same theme. In Kuniyuki v. Acheson 17
Japan was conceded to be "foreign," but it was denied to be a "state."
This view, while it avoids the legal difficulties of the Arikawa decision,
presents some equally damning problems of its own. If absolute inde-
pendence is an essential prerequisite for application of the Nationality
Act, then a citizen may vote with impunity in Bermuda or Libya (or
Byelo-Russia, for that matter) while his compatriot who casts a ballot for
dog-catcher in Montreal forfeits his citizenship automatically. It is dubious
that this is a fair construction of the law.
Whatever may be the weaknesses of these two remarkable cases indi-
vidually, collectively they are subject to criticism on grounds of common
sense. Is it conceivable that Congress intended to distinguish between
such a country as Occupied Japan and, say, China or Iran? It seems doubt-
ful. The views of a leading text-writer in International Law, moreover,
would appear to be opposed to such a distinction. In Lauterpacht's seventh
edition of Oppenheim,'8 published well after the end of the war, there is
13. 83 F. Supp. 473 (S.D. Cal. 1949).
14. Fleming v. Page, 9 How. 603 (U.S. 1850).
15. Brunell v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 68 (S.D. N.Y. 1948).
16. Brewer v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 405 (N.D. Cal. 1948).
17. 94 F. Supp. 358 (W.D. Wash. 1950).
18. 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 111 (7th ed., Lauterpacht, 1948).
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no difference noted between the international standing of Japan and the
status of other sovereign members of the Community of Nations.
Despite the difficulties inherent in the Arikawa and Kuiniyuki holdings,
the Courts have not only accepted them but have been willing to press on
one step further. In Furuno v. Acheson,19 where the "duress" approach
was not alone sufficient to rescue the plaintiff, an additional barrier was
placed in the way of deciding that the Nationality Law was not applicable
to Japan. The Secretary of State tendered in evidence his certificate that
it was the official position of the United States that Japan was "foreign"
and sovereign. Further, he argued that the stand of the executive was
conclusive in matters of foreign sovereignty. Acceptance of this position
would have made it impossible to follow the Arikawa and Kuniyuki doc-
trines to their beneficent conclusion. The Court involved, therefore, re-
jected the proffered certificate as immaterial.
It appears that this decision pushed the flimsy structure created by
the two previous cases too far. For over a century it has been well settled
that it is for the executive to settle matters pertaining to the sovereignty
of foreign lands.2 0 True, it is for the judiciary to construe domestic
statutes, even where the construction adopted differs from that advanced
by the executive;-21 but where it has been a question of whether this
executive power or the opposing judicial prerogative should prevail, the
Court seem always to have deferred, at least in form, to the opinion of
their complement. Thus, in the leading case of Vermilya-Brown v. Con-
2nell2 the Supreme Court construed the term "possession" in the Fair
Labor Standards Act to include the U. S.-leased bases on Bermuda despite
the administrative position to the contrary; but in so doing, the Court
insisted that it was not challenging the preeminence of the executive in
foreign affairs and that its position was perfectly consistent with the views
of the State Department on sovereignty over Bermuda. In like manner
the British Court of Appeal has lately held that the views of the Foreign
Secretary as to the legal status of Germany after the termination of hos-
tilities are conclusive for the purposes of determining who is an "enemy
alien". 23 The decision in the Furuno case, which ignored the over-
whelming effect of this great body of precedent, carried the law of the
Japanese-American nationality cases to a high water mark far beyond es-
tablished law.
It is not enough merely to observe that the instant cases, as soon as
they strike out beyond the comfortably vague doctrine of "duress", are
probably opposed to settled law; for since these decisions relative to Japan,
they have been followed in a case involving Germany.2 4 This is significant.
It reflects a deep-rooted judicial dissatisfaction with the injustice of
19. 94 F. Supp. 381 (S.D. Cal. 1950).
20. Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 13 Pet. 415 (U.S. 1839); Jones v. United
States, 137 U.S. 202 (1890).
21. Burnet v. Chicago Portrait Co., 285 U.S. 1 (1931).
22. 335 U.S. 377 (1948).
23. Rex v. Bottrill, Ex parte Kuechenmeister, [1947] 1 K.B. 41 (1946).
24. Brehm v. Acheson, 90 F. Supp. 662 (S.D. Tex. 1950).
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§ 401(e). The judges appear to be determined that loss of American
nationality shall not be a penalty imposed for such a trivial offence as
voting inadvertently in an election abroad. However, that is just what
Congress intended. The House Committee on Immigration and Naturali-
zation, which reported out the Nationality Act, was apprised in its hear-
ings of the injustice likely to result from this section; 25 but it passed the
provision unchanged. It is the duty of the Courts to enforce it bad though
it may be.
While it is easy to sympathize with the instant courts in their efforts
to right manifest wrong and to place the major share of the blame upon
Congress for making such legal licence necessary, the Courts have not
been beyond reproach. Quite apart from the fact that they have failed to
enforce the stated will of the legislature, the Courts have denied the pre-
eminence of the executive in matters politic and have laid the groundwork
for later distortion of other sections of the Nationality Act. For example,
under the rationale of these cases it should follow that a man who becomes
naturalized in, or swears allegiance to, Germany or Japan cannot be held
to have lost his citizenship despite the provisions of the Nationality Act
that "a person . . . shall lose his nationality by . . . obtaining naturali-
zation in a foreign state . . . or . . . taking an oath of allegiance to a
foreign state," 26 because Germany and Japan are not "foreign states."
It is unthinkable that Congress intended this result. The courts which
decided the Arikawa, Kuniyuki and Furuno cases would have been better
advised to have enforced the law, rejected the plaintiffs' arguments and
left the complainants to their remedy by private bill before Congress,
illusory as that might have turned out to be.
2 7
25. In the Brief of Henry F. Butler, Hearings before the Committee on Im-
migration and Naturalization on. H.R. 6127 stperseded by H.R. 9980, 76th Cong.,
1st. Sess. 381, 387 (1940), it is pointed out that "there is nothing detrimental to the
peace and welfare of the United States" in American citizens voting abroad. It is
this very fact, that these Japanese-Americans have done the country no harm, which
makes the application of § 401 (e) seem unduly harsh in the instant cases.
26. 54 STAT. 1168, 1169 (1940), 8 U.S.C. §§801(a), 801(b) (1946).
27. After this comment was in final form for publication the attention of the
Editors was called to two new cases, as yet unreported, by Assistant U.S. Attorney
John E. Belcher, who appeared for the Government in the Kuniyuki case. In
Kuwahara v. Acheson, Judge Byrne of the Southern District of California decided
that the determination of the executive that Japan was a "foreign state" was con-
clusive, upon the authority of Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co. and Jones v. United
States, note 20 supra. In Uyeno v. Acheson, Judge Yankwich, sitting temporarily
in the Western District of Washington, ruled that the words "foreign state," as
used in § 401(e) of the Nationality Act, were to be construed as the dictates of
common sense would indicate and that, hence, Japan was a "foreign state" within
the meaning of the Act. In both cases, however, the ultimate decision was for the
plaintiffs on the ground that they were coerced by the social pressure then extant
in Japan and the fear of losing their ration cards, the "duress" approach heretofore
discussed with reference to the Ouye and Kai cases, notes 11 and 12 supra.
In view of these two very recent decisions, one handed down on March 5, the
other on March 23, it seems reasonable to predict that the extreme doctrines of the
Arikawa, Kuniyuki and Furow cases will soon be abandoned in favor of the "re-
spectability" of the "duress" approach. Such a development may well occur in the
appeal of Kunignuki v. Acheson, now pending before the Ninth Circuit. If it comes,
it will be a welcome solution to the problems that these Japanese-American cases
have created.
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Trade Regulation-§ 2B of the Robinson-Patman Act Held to
be an Absolute Defense to a Prosecution under § 2A-In the
city of Detroit petitioner sells gasoline directly to about 350 retailers
and four jobbers.' The jobbers receive a one and a half cent per gallon
discount on their purchases. 2  This differential has enabled one jobber to
resell at his own retail stations at a price lower than the established price
of petitioner's retailers,3 and has enabled another jobber to transfer part
of its discount to independent retailers who in the past have also undersold
petitioner's retailers.4 These jobbers do not sell to petitioner's retailers
who are compelled to purchase their full requirements from petitioner. 5
The undercutting has led to serious price wars, and as a result the FTC
instituted proceedings under § 2a of the Robinson-Patman Act,0 which pro-
hibits price discriminations which injure competition. Petitioner attempted
to justify its conduct under § 2b,7 which states that a seller may rebut the
1. In order to qualify as a jobber a dealer must meet certain qualifications:
(1) Maintain sufficient bulk storage to take delivery of gasoline in tank
car quantities (8,000 to 12,000 gallons) rather than in tank-wagon quantities
(700 to 800 gallons) as is customary for service stations;
(2) Own and operate tank wagons and other facilities for delivery of gaso-
line to service stations; ,
(3) Have an established business sufficient to insure purchases of from one
to two million gallons per year; and
(4) Have adequate credit responsibility.
2. The difference is not based on a cost saving. Petitioner could completely
justify the discount if it could show that it saved one and one half cents a gallon
by dealing with jobbers. See note 6 infra.
3. Ned's Auto Supply Co. did not resell its purchases to independent retailers
but disposed of its entire supply through its own retail stations. From 1937 to 1940
Ned's prices were as much as two cents per gallon below the prevailing rate
[Brief for Appellee, p. 11].
4. Citron-Kolb Oil Co. annually sold to retail operators in Detroit at one-cent be-
low petitioner's delivered retail price and another retailer purchased from Citron-Kolb
at one-half cent below petitioner's delivered retail price [Brief for Appellee, p. 15.].
5. One hundred and fifty of these retailers had contracts with the petitioner which
required them to purchase their full requirements only from petitioner. The re-
mainder had no written agreements with the petitioner, but for practical purposes
it was necessary for them to purchase solely from petitioner.
6. 38 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1934), as amended by 49 STAT. 1526
(1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1946). Section 2(a) provides: "That it shall be unlawful
for any person engaged in commerce . . . to discriminate in price between different
purchasers of commodities . . . where the effect of such discrimination may be sub-
stantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce,
or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or
knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either
of them. .. ."
7. Id., §2(b) : "Upon proof being made, at any hearing on a complaint under
this section, that there has been discrimination in price or services or facilities
furnished, the burden of rebutting the prima-facie case thus made by showing justi-
fication shall be upon the person charged with a violation of this section, and
unless justification shall be shown affirmatively, the Commission is authorized to
issue an order terminating the discrimination: Provided, however, that nothing herein
contained shall prevent a seller rebutting the prima-facie case thus made by showing
that his lower price or the furnishing of services or facilities to any purchaser or
purchasers was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor,
or the services or facilities furnished by a competitor."
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prima facie case made against him by showing that his lower price was
made in good faith to meet competition. The Commission rejected this
evidence, holding that § 2b did not provide a legal justification when dele-
terious effects to competition had actually occurred." The Circuit Court
affirmed the cease and desist order' but the Supreme Court reversed and
remanded for further hearings, holding that § 2b provides an absolute
defense. Standard Oil v. FTC, 71 Sup. Ct. 240 (1951).
The rapid growth of chains and large scale buyers after the first
World War demonstrated that the Clayton Act 10 was unable to protect
small businessmen from damaging competition." Its ineffectiveness was
partly due to the provision which allowed a seller to completely justify a
discrimination in price by showing that it was made in good faith to meet
competition. 12  The legislators who framed the Robinson-Patman Act,
which is essentially an anti-chain store bill,'3 definitely intended to narrow
8. 41 F.T.C. 263 (1945), modified by 43 F.T.C. 56 (1946).
9. Standard Oil v. FTC, 173 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1949).
10. 38 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1934). Section 2 provided: "That it
shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce . . . to discriminate in
price between different purchasers of commodities . . .where the effect of such
discrimination may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a mondpoly
in any line of commerce; Provided, That nothing herein contained shall prevent
. . . discrimination in price in the same or different communities made in good
faith to meet competition. .. ."
11. The scope of the Act was seriously narrowed by the decisions in Mennen
v. FTC, 288 Fed. 774 (2d Cir. 1923), cert. denied, 262 U.S. 759 (1923), and National
Biscuit Co. v. FTC 299 Fed. 733 (2d Cir. 1924), cert. denied, 266 U.S. 613 (1924),
which held that the Clayton Act applied only to a decrease in competition between a
seller and his own competitors. It was not until George Van Camp and Sons v.
American Can Co., 278 U.S. 245 (1929), that the court extended the coverage of the
Act to adverse effects on the competition between buyers.
The resulting distress among small businessmen led to a large scale Senate in-
vestigation of the growth of chains which culminated in a final report issued in 1934.
See FTC, "Final Report on the Chain Store Investigation," SEN. Doc. No. 4, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1934). The report provoked congressional action which eventually
led to the passage of the Robinson-Patman Act. See ZORN AND FELDMAN, BusINEss
UNDER THE, Nxw PRicE LAws, 46 et seq. (1937).
12. SEN. REP. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1935): "The weakness of
present section 2 lies principally in the fact that: (1) It places no limit upon
differentials permissible on account of differences in quantity; and (2) it permits
discriminations to meet competition, and thus tends to substitute the remedies of
retaliation for those of law, with destructive conseqences to the central object of the
bill. Liberty to meet competition which can be met only by price cuts at the ex-
pense of customers elsewhere, is in its unmasked effect the liberty to destroy
competition by selling locally below cost, a weapon progressively the more de-
structive in the hands of the more powerful, and most deadly to the competitor of
limited resources, whatever his merit and efficiency. While the bill as now reported
closes these dangerous loopholes, it leaves the fields of competition free and open to
the most efficient, and thus in fact protects them the more securely against inunda-
tions of mere power and size. . ..
13. The Bill was sponsored mainly by the United States Wholesale Grocers
Association, which took a leading part in the vigorous campaign before its introduction
and in the congressional hearings. See ZORN AND FELDMAN, op. cit. mspra note 11,
at 51. It was in fact prepared by counsel for the association. See Hearings before
Committee in Judiciary on H.R. 8442, H.R. 4995, H.R. 5062, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1935).
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or eliminate that "loophole", 14 but they were opposed by those who objected
to a prohibition or modification of a generally accepted business practice.1 5
The conflict of views led to a compromise which became § 2b of the Act.
The unusual wording and the separation of the § 2b defense from the
other admittedly absolute defenses '6 which appear in § 2a of the Act left
the legal effect of this compromise cloaked in confusion.17 The sponsors
of the bill claimed that meeting competition in good faith was no longer
an absolute defense. Representative Patman stated that § 2b was for
mitigation purposes only.'8 Representative Utterback, House manager of
the bill, claimed that § 2b defense presented a "question of fact to be
determined in every case, whether the competition to be met was such to
justify the discrimination". 9 The Federal Trade Commission in the in-
stant case contended that meeting competition in good faith was not a
justification when actual detrimental effects to competition had occurred.2 0
Contrary to these views, most of the legal writers who have commented
on the bill believed that § 2b could be interpreted only as furnishing a
complete defense.21 In the few court cases in which a seller has pleaded
§ 2b as a defense, the courts have always found that the seller did not
prove good faith, but have indicated that § 2b would provide an absolute
14. See Gordon, Robinson-Patnum Anti-Discrmination Act-The Meanings of
Sections One am Three, 22 A.B.A.J. 593, 597 (1936).
15. See Gordon, supra note 14, at 597; See 80 CoNG. REc. 6435-36, 8235 (1936).
16. Standard Oil, 41 F.T.C. 263, 283 (1945).
17. See Bayley, Four Years Under the Robinson-Patinan Act, 25 MINN. L. REv.
131, 172 (1941); Notes, The Legality of Discrimination Under the Robinson-Patman
Act, 36 COL. L. REv. 1285, 1311 (1936), The Robinson-Patinan Act: Some Pros-
pective Problems of Construction and Constitutionality, 50 HIv. L. REv. 106, 117
(1936).
18. PATMAN, THE RoBINSON-PATI:AN ACr 40 (1938): "The proviso does not
permit price discrimination to meet competition. It does not so state. It merely
grants to the accused, in defense of a charge of having violated the Act, the oppor-
tunity to offer in rebuttal, as a mitigating circumstance, evidence that he may have
engaged in an unlawful discrimination in order to meet competition. . . . In sun
and sutbstance, the provision permits the accused to throw himself upon the mercy
of the court." (italics added). See Note, The Robinson-Patinan Act, 85 U. OF PA.
L. REv. 306, 310 (1936).
19. 80 CONG. REc. 9418 (1936) : "In connection with the above rule as to burden
of proof, it is also provided that a seller may show that his lower price was made
in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor, or that his furnishing
of services or facilities was made in good faith to meet those furnished by a com-
petitor. It is to be noted, however, that this does not set up the meeting of competi-
tion as an absolute bar to a charge of discrimination under the bill. It merely permits
it to be shown in evidence. This provision is entirely procedural. It does not
determine substantive rights, liabilities, and duties. They are fixed in the other
provisions of the bill. It leaves it a question of fact to be determined in each case,
whether the competition to be met was such as to justify the discrimination given,
as one lying within the limitations laid down by the bill, and whether the way in
which the competition was met lies within the latitude allowed by those limita-
tions. .. ."
20. Instant case at 256.
21. BEER, FFDERAL TRADE LAW AND PRAcTiCE 115 (1942); Haslett, Price Dis-
criminations and Their Justifications Under the Robinsoll-Patinan Act of 1936, 46
Micr. L. Rnv. 450, 477 (1948) ; Gordon, supra note 14, at 598.
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defense if good faith were established.2 2  In the instant case the court
held that § 2b was an absolute defense.2
Unquestionably the proponents of the Robinson-Patman Act intended
to alter the "meeting competition" defense of the Clayton Act .2  But in
order to prevent § 2b from being declared unconstitutional it appears neces-
sary to reject the various interpretations which would limit the defense.2 5
The explanation of Representative Patman clashes with the decision in the
Fairmont Creamery Case,2 6 which held that a state anti-price discrimina-
tion statute without a "meeting competition" defense was an unconstitu-
tional violation of the right to contract. Representative Utterback's inter-
pretation also creates constitutional objections. First, the failure to estab-
lish a definite legislative standard might be an unconstitutional delegation
of power; 27 second, the over-all vagueness of the interpretation, which
makes it impossible for a particular seller to determine if he is complying
with the Act, would probably render it void for indefiniteness.28  The con-
tention of the Federal Trade Commission is equally unacceptable in view
of court decisions which hold that in all cases the agency must show
actual or imminent detrimental effects in order to make out a prima facie
case.29 Thus, the Commission's interpretation would make any defense
under § 2b irrelevant inasmuch as the Commission believes that § 2b does
not excuse a seller when the Commission has shown harmful effects to
competition.3 0 The only way to interpret § 2b as constitutional and to
prevent it from being mere surplusage is to hold that § 2b provides an
absolute defense.
It would appear that as a matter of economics the court decision is
proper since the cease and desist order would not remedy the injury to
competition which has occurred.31 If the jobbers can't purchase from peti-
22. See FTC v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746, 759 (1945); Moss v.
FTC, 148 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945). See, e.g.
Corn Products Refining Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726, 741 (1945); FTC v. Morton
Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 43 (1948) ; The FTC itself in Ferro-Enamel Corp., 42 FTC
36 provided that a cease and desist order "shall not prevent the respondent manu-
facturers from showing that any lower price to any purchaser was made in good
faith to meet competition. See also, Anheuser Busch, Inc., 31 FTC 986 (1940);
Bausch and Lomb Optical Co., 28 FTC 186 (1939).
23. Instant case at 250.
24. See note 14 mipra.
25. See Note, The Legality of Discrimination Under the Robinson-Patman Act,
36 CoL. L. Ray. 1285, 1311 (1936); George, Business and The Robinson.-Patinan
Act; the First Year, 4 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD. 392 (1937).
26. Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 274 U.S. 1 (1928).
27. 62 HARV. L. REv. 1249, 1251 (1949).
28. A.B. Small Co. v. American Sugar Refining Co., 267 U.S. 233 (1925).
29. See discussion in ZORN AND FELDMAN, op. cit. snpra note 11, at 234-243. Cf.
FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 43 (1948).
30. See note 20 supra.
31. It has been suggested that in theory the Robinson-Patman Act conflicts with
the purposes of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, since it is designed to limit compe-
tition whereas the former Acts were designed to foster competition, for although the
ostensible purpose is to prevent injury to competition, in effect, it prevents injury
to competitors. The two are not the same. See, Adelman, Effective Competition
RECENT CASES
tioner they will buy from the seller who offered the lower price, the inde-
pendent retailers will continue to receive the same discount, and price wars
will continue.3 2 It has been suggested that the § 2b defense be restricted
to situations where the price to be met is itself a lawful price,33 for if the
other seller is unlawfully discriminating among his buyers, then it can be
enjoined by the Act.3 4 However, this alternative is undesirable since in
most situations it is impossible for a seller to investigate his opponent's
price policy to determine its legality, and any procrastination on his part
will cause him to lose busiiiess. The seller must be permitted to act
promptly; then if the Commission finds that the provoking seller has vio-
lated the Act and enjoins its discrimination, the seller who has discriminated
under duress will be profitably able to discontinue its own unfair price
policy. It appears that the Commission itself believes that § 2b should
provide an absolute defense, for in hearings on proposed legislation the
Commission recommended that the Act be changed to unequivocally grant
to a seller the same right to meet competition as the Clayton Act provided.
35
and the Antitrust Laws, 61 HARV. L. REv. 1289, 1327-1350 (1948) ; Burns, The Anti-
Trust Laws and the Regulation of Price Competition, 4 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.
301 (1937) ; McAllister, Price Control by Law in the United States, A Survey, 4
LAW & CONTEmP. PRa. 273 (1937); Learned and Issacs, The Robinson-Patman
Law: Some Assumptions and Expectations, 15 HARV. Bus. REv. 137 (1936).
32. Although this point is not mentioned in the court opinion it obviously im-
pressed the justices during oral argument. Justice Jackson remarked that the situa-
tion in this case "troubles me." The whole philosophy of the Sherman Act is compe-
tition, he explained, while the whole philosophy here is that you must not compete
to get the business. 19 U.S.L. WEEKc 3102 (U.S. Oct. 17, 1950).
33. There are several ways in which the other seller's low price may be lawful:
(1) He may distribute only to jobbers and will have a single price.
(2) He may be able to show that the differential is based on cost savings.
(3) He may not be operating in interstate commerce.
34. 80 CONG. REc. 9418 (1936) (statement by Rep. Utterback) : "This procedural
provision cannot be construed as a carte blanche exemption to violate the bill so
long as a competitor can be shown to have violated it first, nor so long as that
competition cannot be met without the use of oppressive discriminations in violation
of the obvious intent of the bill . . . If this proviso were construed to permit the
showing of a competing offer as an absolute bar to liability for discrimination, then
it would nullify the act entirely at the very inception of its enforcement, for in
nearly every case mass buyers receive similar discriminations from competing sellers
of the same product. One violation of law cannot be permitted to justify another.
As in any case of self-defense, while the attack against which the defense is claimed
may be shown in evidence, its competency as a bar depends also upon whether it was
a legal or illegal attack. A discrimination in violation of this bill is in practical effect
a commercial bribe to lure the business of the favored customer away from the
competitor, and if one bribe were permitted to justify another the bill would be
futile to achieve its plainly intended purposes."
35. In January 1949 the Commission told a Senate Committee that good faith
meeting of an equally low price should be a full defense because "the policy of the
law should not discourage active competition by preventing the meeting of compe-
tition in good faith." Hearings before Subcomnittee of the Senate Interstate and
Foreign Commerce Committee on S. 236 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 274 (1949). Three
weeks after the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals in the instant case, the
Commission told another Senate Committee it saw no objection to a change in the
law to make good faith meeting of an equally low price a full defense. Hearings
Before Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S1008, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1949). In June 1949 the Commission told a House Committee
that "all of the commissioners believe it would be preferable to make the good
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This decision will not permit petitioner to continue its present policy
unless it can convince the Commission that it was acting in good faith.
The Commission has not yet determined this matter, although the trial
examiner found for the petitioner on this issue.3 6 On reexamination it is
very questionable if petitioner can prove "good faith". In previous cases
the courts have indicated that they will narrowly construe the term "good
faith" and will require the seller to prove that its entire pricing policy
was equitable.3 7 Such a strict interpretation will prevent a seller from
using its lower prices to destroy local competition while recouping local
losses by charging excessive prices in areas where no competition exists.
This is the practice which the proponents of the Robinson-Patman Act
specifically intended to eliminate.3 8  Inasmuch as petitioner has prevented
its retailers from purchasing from jobbers, 39 and since petitioner has re-
fused to permit its retailers to perform the jobbing function themselves by
cooperative methods, 40 it is doubtful if petitioner can sustain its burden
of proof. Thus, although the decision has conclusively established § 2b as
an absolute defense, the petitioner will probably not benefit from it.
faith meeting of competition a complete defense," because failure to do so "necessarily
involves the risk of impairing the vigor of competition among sellers." Hearings
Before Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary on S.1008, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess., 61 (1949).
36. Instant case at 244.
37. FTC v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746 (1945).
38. See 80 CONG. REG. 8235 (1936) ; see note 12 supra.
39. See note 5 stpra.
40. [Brief for Retail Gasoline Dealers Association of Michigan et al., as Amici
Curiae, p. 9.]
